Na de euforie van het klimaatakkoord van Parijs (2015), waarin landen de wens hebben uitgesproken om de opwarming van de aarde (eigenlijk: atmosfeer) te beperken tot 2 graden Celsius, en liefst 1,5 graad, hebben zich enkele belangrijke ontwikkelingen voorgedaan in de internationale klimaatdiplomatie.

Zoals ik al eerder schreef was deze euforie misplaatst, al was het alleen maar omdat men het eens was geworden over niet meer dan een verzameling intentieverklaringen inzake het klimaatbeleid van de individuele deelnemers, waaraan geen sancties waren verbonden bij niet–nakoming. Bovendien was de som van hun beloften bij lange na niet voldoende om de gestelde doelstellingen te halen, ook al omdat grote CO2–emittenten als China en India tot 2030 waren vrijgesteld van enige verplichting, of zelfs belofte om hun CO2–uitstoot te beperken.

Onder de titel, ‘Bolsonaro in, Merkel out: the Paris climate gang is breaking up’, schreef Sara Stefanini voor Climate Home News een overzicht van de scheuren die zich thans manifesteren in de coalitie van landen die destijds een voortrekkersrol speelden in het internationale klimaatbeleid.

Ik pik er een aantal elementen uit.

In 2015, a group of countries banded together to shape the global climate pact, but political turmoil is pulling the alliance apart. …

In 2015, the world’s top two emitters, the US and China, joined with Brazil, some small island countries and the European Union, led by Germany, France and the UK, to land the agreement.

But climate change politics have shifted significantly since then, with two more big tilts this week. Brazil elected a staunch and radical antienvironmentalist president, while Germany’s Angela Merkel confirmed her exit plans, further weakening an already fading image as the “climate chancellor” and Europe’s goto leader in the field.

It is the latest bout of a malaise that has infected climate efforts since Donald Trump was elected in the US in 2016.

Now, in many important countries, climate scepticism and economic nationalism are usurping the international green enthusiasm of 2015. As a result, political support for slashing greenhouse gas emissions, sending aid to the poorest and most vulnerable countries and discussing it all in multilateral summits is waning. Others that remain committed to climate action are consumed by domestic concerns – like Brexit in the UK, and political instability in Germany.

None of this bodes well for the Cop24 climate summit in Katowice, Poland this December, where nearly 200 countries must agree the complex rules to keep each other on track to fulfil the Paris goals for limiting the temperature rise. Negotiations in the run-up to what observers are calling the most important Cop since Paris have been slow and fraught. …

The election of the rightwing Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil is set to bring radical changes, including opening the Amazon to mining, agriculture and construction and merging the environment and agriculture ministries. Bolsonaro said last week that he would not pull out of the Paris Agreement, as long as it did not affect Brazilian control over the Andes mountains, Amazon and Atlantic Ocean. Previously, however, he praised US president Trump for his decision to withdraw. …

Compared to Bolsonaro’s Brazil, the German shift will be far more subtle – with continued headline support for the Paris Agreement and strict rules to fulfil it, as well as financial aid for poorer countries.

But Merkel’s announcement on Monday, that she will step down as leader of her conservative Christian Democratic Union and will not stand for reelection in 2021, further weakens her clout. Her image on climate change has already taken a hit this year, amid criticism for allowing deforestation for a coal mine, failure to meet the country’s 2020 emissions reduction goal, and slow progress on setting an end date for coal use.

It marks a change from 2015, when Merkel won praise for securing a G7 commitment to keeping the temperature below 2C, just months before Paris. Germany’s Energiewende pivot to renewable energy has also lost its lustre since then, and is now blamed for keeping coal afloat to make up for the shutdown of emissionsfree nuclear power plants. …

Meanwhile Australia – always reluctant to take climate action that might harm its large resource economy – is growing more brazen, criticising international climate talks and funding and ruling out a quick end to coal use. …

Similar views are still alive and kicking in coalreliant Poland, which presides over Cop24. Warsaw tends to stress the need for a gradual transition from coal, along with forestry and technology to catch CO2 and offset fossil fuel burning, and the rise of electric transport – which could present new demand for coal-fired power.

Even China, which has set high targets for cutting coal use and adding renewables and electric vehicles, sticks to a hard line behind negotiating doors. It wants to differentiate the responsibilities for developing economies and put more burden on developed countries – something the US and EU oppose. …

Bron hier.

En zo zijgt het kaartenhuis van het internationale klimaatbeleid langzaam ineen.

Maar er is nog één klein landje in het noordwesten van Europa, dat zich met zijn energietransitie dapper verzet tegen deze massale erosie van internationale steun voor het klimaatbeleid en – zonder zich daarvan ook maar iets aan te trekken – in zijn eentje de wereld wil redden van die catastrofale opwarming (die overigens maar steeds niet wil komen).

Voor recente satellietmetingen van de gemiddelde wereldtemperatuur zie hier: